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The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule assigns probabilities to quantum measure-
ment results at time t on the condition that the system is prepared in a given way
at t1 < t and found in a given state at t2 > t. The question whether the rule can
also be applied counterfactually to the case where no measurement is performed at
the intermediate time t has recently been the subject of controversy. I argue that
the counterfactual meaning may be understood in terms of the true value of an
observable at t. Such a value cannot be empirically determined for, by stipulation,
the measurement that would yield it is not performed. Nevertheless, it may or
may not be well-defined depending on one’s proposed interpretation of quantum
mechanics. Various examples are discussed illustrating what can be asserted at
the intermediate time without running into contradictions.
1 Introduction
The Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz (ABL) rule 1 was proposed in 1964 to
compute measurement result probabilities of systems that are both preselected
and postselected. It was meant to provide a time-reversal invariant formulation
of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics.
As long as a measurement is actually carried out between pre- and postse-
lection, the ABL rule is a straightforward consequence of the Born probability
rule and usual assumptions on the quantum state following a measurement. At-
tempts have been made, however, to interpret the ABL rule counterfactually,
that is, to cases where no intermediate measurement is made. The resulting
controversy is, I believe, partly due to the fact that proposed definitions of
counterfactuals in the present quantum-mechanical context do not adequately
capture the intuitive meaning of the notion.
In this paper I first review the derivation of the ABL rule and some of
its properties, in particular contextuality. Next I analyze alleged proofs of
the impossibility of interpreting the rule counterfactually, as well as various
arguments supporting or opposing them. I attempt to clarify the meaning
of a counterfactual interpretation, and point out circumstances in which the
counterfactual assertion of the ABL rule is or is not correct.
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2 The ABL rule
Consider a quantum system S and three observables A, C and B pertaining
to it. For simplicity, we shall first assume that these observables are discrete
and nondegenerate.
Suppose that at time t1, S is prepared in an eigenstate |a〉 of A. At t > t1,
the observable C is measured. According to the Born rule, the probability
of obtaining result ci (where {cj} is the set of eigenvalues of C) is given by
|〈ci|a〉|
2.a
Suppose the result ci is indeed obtained upon measurement at t. We as-
sume the measurement interaction is such that immediately after t, the system
is in state |ci〉. At a later time t2, the observable B is measured. The proba-
bility of obtaining result b is then given by |〈b|ci〉|
2. Hence the probability of
result ci and result b, conditional on preparation |a〉, is equal to
P (ci ∧ b|a) = |〈b|ci〉〈ci|a〉|
2. (1)
We are interested here in the probability of obtaining ci at t, on the con-
dition that S is prepared in |a〉 at t1 < t and found in |b〉 at t2 > t. This we
shall denote by P (ci|a, b). From the definition of conditional probability, we
have (for P (b|a) 6= 0)
P (ci|a, b) =
P (ci ∧ b|a)
P (b|a)
. (2)
Here P (b|a) is the total probability of b (given preparation |a〉), equal to the
sum of P (cj ∧ b|a) over all possible results cj. From (1) we obtain
P (ci|a, b) =
|〈b|ci〉〈ci|a〉|
2
∑
j |〈b|cj〉〈cj |a〉|
2
=
Tr(PbPciPaPci)∑
j Tr(PbPcjPaPcj )
. (3)
This is the ABL rule 1. In the right-hand side, Pa and Pb are projectors on
states |a〉 and |b〉. The operator Pci projects on |ci〉 or, if the eigenvalue ci is
degenerate, on the associated subspace.b The ABL rule (expressed in terms of
projection operators) also holds in that case, provided the intermediate mea-
surement obeys the Lu¨ders rule |a〉 → NPci |a〉 (where N is a normalization
constant). The ABL rule can also be written for multiple intermediate mea-
surements or for selection by means of density matrices rather than pure states,
but we won’t need these generalizations here.
aAll kets are normalized. We assume that the system’s Hamiltonian vanishes in between
measurements. If it does not, evolution operators must be appropriately inserted, or kets
expressed in the Heisenberg picture.
bThe sum over j is then carried out on these subspaces.
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A much discussed property of the ABL rule is its contextuality. Let |u1〉,
|u2〉 and |u3〉 be an orthonormal basis in a three-dimensional Hilbert space.
Each of these kets can represent a state wherein a particle is in one of three
disjoint boxes. Take the initial and final states as
|a〉 = 1√
3
{|u1〉+ |u2〉+ |u3〉} , (4)
|b〉 = 1√
3
{|u1〉+ |u2〉 − |u3〉} . (5)
Let the intermediate observable C be so chosen as to have |u1〉 as one of its
eigenvectors, corresponding to a nondegenerate eigenvalue c1. The ABL rule
then yields
P (c1|a, b) =
Tr(PbPc1PaPc1)∑
j Tr(PbPcjPaPcj )
. (6)
It turns out that the right-hand side of this equation is not well-defined unless
C itself is well-defined. Let c1, c2 and c3 be three different real numbers and
define
C = c1|u1〉〈u1|+ c2|u2〉〈u2|+ c3|u3〉〈u3|. (7)
Elementary algebra shows that P (c1|a, b) = 1/3. But if
C′ = c1|u1〉〈u1|+ c2{|u2〉〈u2|+ |u3〉〈u3|}, (8)
then P (c1|a, b) = 1. Hence the ABL probability of c1 depends not only on
the eigenspace associated with that eigenvalue, but also on the structure of
the observable in the orthogonal eigenspace. This is contextuality. In terms of
boxes, this means the following. If an observable (C′) distinguishes the first
box from the other two taken together, then the ABL probability of being in
the first box is 1. If another observable (C) distinguishes the three boxes one
from another, the ABL probability of being in the first box is 1/3.
It is easy to check that if C = A,
P (a|a, b) = 1. (9)
Likewise if C = B,
P (b|a, b) = 1. (10)
From (9) and (10), Albert, Aharonov and D’Amato have argued that non-
commuting observables A and B must be simultaneously well-defined at t 2.
This conclusion hinges on a counterfactual use of the ABL rule. It was indeed
intended to apply specifically to the case where neither A nor B are measured
between pre- and postselection.
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3 Counterfactual interpretation
Can the ABL rule be interpreted counterfactually? That question was an-
swered in the negative by Sharp and Shanks 3, Cohen 4 and Miller 5, and
much debated afterwards.
The crux of the Sharp and Shanks argument (as well as others) can be
stated rather succinctly. Let |b〉 and |b′〉 be the possible final states of a two-
state system. Suppose C is not measured, and assume that the ABL rule
correctly gives the probability of nondegenerate result c1, conditional on pre-
and postselection, had C been measured. The total probability of c1 should
then be given as a weighted sum on the possible final states, that is,
P (c1|a) = |〈b|a〉|
2P (c1|a, b) + |〈b
′|a〉|2P (c1|a, b
′). (11)
Here |〈b|a〉|2 is the probability of final state |b〉 when no intermediate mea-
surement is made, and P (c1|a, b) is the conditional probability of c1 based on
the counterfactual interpretation of the ABL rule. But according to standard
quantum mechanics, P (c1|a) is given by |〈c1|a〉|
2. Hence we should have
|〈c1|a〉|
2 = |〈b|a〉|2
Tr(PbPc1PaPc1)∑
j Tr(PbPcjPaPcj )
+ |〈b′|a〉|2
Tr(Pb′Pc1PaPc1)∑
j Tr(Pb′PcjPaPcj )
. (12)
Since this is not true in general (counterexamples are easily found), Sharp and
Shanks conclude that the counterfactual use is invalid.
The validity of the counterfactual use and the relevance of the Sharp
and Shanks argument were debated between Vaidman 6,7,8,9,10 and Kast-
ner 11,12,13,14. Vaidman’s objection to the proof consists in pointing out that
the weight |〈b|a〉|2 in (11) is the probability of b if no intermediate measurement
occurs. Since we are asking for the total probability of result c1, we must use
the expression for the probability of b if C is measured at t. That probability
is given by
∑
j Tr(PbPcjPaPcj ). But then Eq. (11) becomes
P (c1|a) =
∑
j
Tr(PbPcjPaPcj )P (c1|a, b) +
∑
j
Tr(Pb′PcjPaPcj )P (c1|a, b
′)
= Tr(PbPc1PaPc1) + Tr(Pb′Pc1PaPc1)
= Tr(Pc1PaPc1)
= |〈c1|a〉|
2, (13)
in accordance with standard quantum mechanics.
The significance of this calculation of P (c1|a) is best brought out by quot-
ing Vaidman’s definition of the counterfactual meaning of the ABL rule 8:
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If a measurement of an observable C were performed at time t,
then the probability for C = cj would equal P (cj), provided that
the results of measurements performed on the system at times t1
and t2 are fixed.
This is a statement about the statistical distribution of results of unperformed
experiments, made on the basis of a law derived from a large number of per-
formed experiments identical to the former in all relevant respects.c It is like
saying, on the basis of numerous tosses of a die yielding essentially uniform
outcomes, that had the die been tossed one additional time, the probability
of obtaining “3” would have been 1/6. Both this statement and Vaidman’s
definition express the regularity of Nature. Both assert, on the basis of a
general rule drawn from numerous experimental trials, that if the experiment
were done over again in the same relevant conditions, the results would fall un-
der the same general rule. Hence Vaidman’s statement is (presumably) true,
genuinely counterfactual, but not particularly illuminating, at least as far as
specificities of quantum mechanics are concerned.d
In contrast with Vaidman, Kastner defended the Sharp and Shanks proof
and argued that a nontrivial counterfactual assertion of the ABL rule (i.e. one
that provides information about specific systems) is false. Kastner’s analysis
draws from both Goodman’s and Lewis’s theories of counterfactuals 15,16,17.
Her argument can be summarized as follows.
A counterfactual p ✷→ q (read “If it were that p, it would be that q.”) is
true if p is not true and the conjunction of p with laws of nature L and suitable
background conditions S implies q, that is,
(p ∧ L ∧ S)→ q. (14)
Now clearly, there must be restrictions on S for, if S includes the statement
¬p (“not p”), implication (14) will hold trivially. These restrictions usually
state that S should be “cotenable” with p, a notion not so easy to define but
essentially meaning that S is independent of the truth of p.
Suppose that in the real world, preparation |a〉 is followed by postselection
|b〉, with no intermediate measurement. Then had there been an intermediate
measurement, the intermediate state would have changed, and the final mea-
surement result b could no longer be expected to obtain. In other words, result
b is not cotenable with measuring C.
cAdmittedly, our belief in the noncounterfactual validity of the ABL rule comes from more
indirect evidence, but this does not affect the present discussion.
dThe relation between weak values and measurement results with unit ABL probability 9
does not affect that remark, since it can be established solely on the basis of the noncoun-
terfactual use of the ABL rule.
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Does it follow from this argument that the nontrivial counterfactual as-
sertion of the ABL rule is false? The answer is affirmative if the background
conditions must include the result b. But this is not necessarily the case. The
background conditions can be construed as encompassing everything that char-
acterizes the state of the system at t, including whatever might induce it to
yield result b upon measurement of B at t2. With such a definition, the result
b itself is not part of the background conditions. And although cotenability
might be analyzed in that context, I shall use a different approach.
I submit that the proper way of investigating the counterfactual validity of
the ABL rule is to enquire about the “true value” of C at t. Strict empiricists
will no doubt quit reading right here, since it is absolutely impossible, in a
situation where C has not been measured between t1 and t2, to empirically
ascertain what the true value of C was at the intermediate time t. But that
doesn’t prevent different theories or interpretations to make claims on what
the true value is, as we will presently see.
4 What can be said at t?
It is instructive to analyze the Sharp and Shanks argument in terms of true
values. If, following standard quantum mechanics, P (c1|a) is equal to |〈c1|a〉|
2,
then the first equality in (13) holds identically. But Sharp and Shanks claim
that the counterfactual meaning of the ABL rule is encapsulated in Eq. (11).
It is easy to see that (11) and (13) will coincide if
|〈b|a〉|2 =
∑
j
Tr(PbPcjPaPcj ), (15)
together with a similar equation with b replaced by b′. In quantum mechanics,
Eq. (15) does not hold in general.
The left-hand side of (15) is the uncontroversial probability of b when
no intermediate measurement is performed, while the right-hand side is the
uncontroversial probability of b when C is measured at the intermediate time.
That the equality is false means that whichever true value C does or does not
have at the intermediate time t, it cannot be one that is simply revealed in
and unaffected by an eventual measurement.
It was pointed out in 4 that (15) holds if (Pa, {Pcj}, Pb) makes up a
consistent family of histories.e Indeed in that case one can maintain that C
has a well-defined value (equal to one of its eigenvalues) without running into
contradictions. But of course one is not compelled to do so. Associating or
eFor relevant definitions see 18, Sect. 12.6.
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not associating true values to observables belonging to a consistent family of
histories contributes in defining the interpretation of the theory.
It is instructive to recall the example of Sect. 2, with |a〉 and |b〉 defined
as in Eqs. (4) and (5). Let C and C′ be defined as in (7) and (8) and let
C′′ = c1{|u1〉〈u1|+ |u3〉〈u3|}+ c2|u2〉〈u2|. (16)
It is easy to check that
(Pa, {Pu1 , I − Pu1}, Pb) (17)
and
(Pa, {Pu2 , I − Pu2}, Pb) (18)
make up distinct consistent families of histories. The ABL probability that
C′ = c1 is one, and so is the ABL probability that C′′ = c2. We won’t run
into contradictions if we maintain that the particle was surely in box 1 at t.
Likewise we won’t run into contradictions if we maintain that it was in box 2.
Of course both statements cannot be held at once, since they are logically
contradictory. Note that the family of histories
(Pa, {Pu1 , Pu2 , Pu3}, Pb) , (19)
more refined than either (17) or (18), is not consistent.
The families (Pa, {Pak}, Pb) and (Pa, {Pbl}, Pb), where {ak} and {bl} stand
for the set of eigenvalues of A and B, are always consistent. Hence it can be
maintained that A has the true value a at intermediate times, or that B has
the true value b. We have assumed that P (b|a) 6= 0. Therefore |b〉 and |a〉 are
not orthogonal. So it is not a priori logically inconsistent to assume that A
and B both have true values at intermediate times.f It is not clear whether a
full-fledged interpretation can be implemented along these lines, for arbitrary
observables A and B.
The ABL rule is symmetric under permutation of preselection and post-
selection. This means that for the purpose of making probabilistic statements
about intermediate measurement outcomes, the initial and final states |a〉 and
|b〉 have exactly the same utility. This does not necessarily entail that they are
equally useful for the purpose of making ontological statements. In von Neu-
mann’s measurement theory 19, for instance, a measurement is an interaction
between a quantum system and an apparatus, followed by a collapse. From
the time t1 when the system is prepared in state |a〉 to the time t when an
fNote that if Pab denotes the projector on the subspace spanned by |a〉 and |b〉, then the
family of histories (Pa, {Pab, I − Pab}, Pb) is consistent.
7
ontological statement is to be made, no physical action occurs on the system.
Such is not the case, however, between t and t2. Indeed a physical interaction
of the quantum system with an apparatus has to occur sometime before t2, for
the system to collapse to |b〉 at t2. In that context, it may be more natural to
hold that |a〉, rather than |b〉, is the correct state at t, and that A = a, rather
than B = b, expresses a true value.
In some interpretations of quantum mechanics, true values of observables
can be assigned outside the context of consistent families of histories. Their
statistical distributions, however, will not obey the ABL rule. An example is
Bohmian mechanics, where the true value of position is defined at any inter-
mediate time 20. But in general, (Pa, {Px}, Pb) does not make up a consistent
family. In this context, the meaning of background conditions proposed at the
end of the last section is particularly clear. Suppose that |a〉 and |b〉 corre-
spond to one-dimensional wave functions ψa(x) and ψb(x), with ψa a Gaussian
and ψb a function uniform over some interval ∆ and zero elsewhere (i.e. |b〉
postselects through a slit of width ∆). All Bohmian trajectories going through
∆ at t2 have gone through some other interval ∆t at t. Hence the background
conditions associated with preselection |a〉 and postselection |b〉 are the wave
function at t together with the interval ∆t of true positions. Of course if po-
sition is measured at t, the wave function will change accordingly, and so will
the measurement result probabilities at t2.
It was pointed out by Vaidman 8 that no hidden variable theory can
reproduce the ABL rule in all situations.g Indeed take an ensemble of spin
1/2 particles prepared in the state |a〉 = |+; zˆ〉. If there is no intermediate
measurement, postselection in the state |b〉 = |a〉 will in fact introduce no
additional selection. Hence if no backward causality is assumed, true values at
t must be the same whether postselection does or does not occur, irrespective
of any hidden variables. But then the probability that a measurement at t of
the spin along nˆ yields + must be equal to cos2{ 1
2
cos−1(nˆ · zˆ)}, which differs
from the ABL value.
In the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (or at least in the
most instrumentalistic versions of it), an observable C has a value only when
a measurement of C indicates that value. This is also the case in Mohrhoff’s
more recent interpretation 21,22, which incorporates the ABL rule explicitly.
The fact that the ABL rule predicts a statistical distribution of values of C
implies, according to Mohrhoff, an objective fuzziness of C in the case where
the experiment is not performed. I believe that statement is genuinely and
gVaidman is well aware that in hidden-variable theories, counterfactual statements involve
fixing the values of hidden variables. See for instance his discussion in 7, Sect. 5.
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nontrivially counterfactual.h It asserts that no unmeasured observable of no
individual system whatsoever has a true value in the interval between pre- and
postselection.
5 Conclusion
The noncounterfactual meaning of the ABL rule is not controversial. The
validity of the rule is then a straightforward consequence of standard quantum
mechanics and usual hypotheses on the state of a quantum system immediately
after measurement. The rule is also true counterfactually if it simply expresses
the reproducibility of experiments.
A counterfactual meaning more relevant to the specificities of quantum
mechanics refers to the true value of an observable at an intermediate time,
when no observable is actually measured between pre- and postselection. In
general the ABL rule is then counterfactually false. It can be true, however,
when associated with a consistent family of histories or when asserting objec-
tive fuzziness or nonvaluedness of observables not being measured.
Although statements about true values between pre- and postselection
may not have definite empirical meaning, they can fruitfully be viewed as
contributing to define the interpretation of the quantum-mechanical theory.
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